Abstract: In this paper I propose an approach to Epicurean theology that avoids the stalemate of "realist" and "idealist" interpretations. I argue that Epicurean theology is more phenomenological than metaphysical, its purpose less to ground and justify dogmatic commitment to whatever form of existence the gods may enjoy than to account for a prevalent aspect of ancient religious experience, epiphany, and to assimilate that experience to Epicurean philosophical therapeia.
For epiphany forms the very foundation of atomist theology. Unlike the Stoics, who formulated proof after scholastic proof for divine existence-the so-called e gradibus entium, via eminentiae, via analogiae, the argument from design, and so forth 5 -Epicurus and, so far as the evidence permits us to assert, his predecessor Democritus were not in the first place concerned to appeal to logical demonstration in order to justify their belief in gods. For this reason the atomist philosophers have seemed to provide unsatisfactory, inconsistent or even unintelligible answers to the traditional question posed to them by ancient doxographer and modern scholar alike, the question efi efis‹ yeo¤, "whether gods exist". 6 This ontological question, which both Democritus and
Epicurus would have answered in the affirmative, entails specifying what sort of existence the gods enjoy; here again critics both ancient and modern have expressed dissatisfaction and disagreement over atomist accounts. Thus Balbus in Cicero's De natura deorum faults Democritus and Epicurus for, as he sees it, reducing the gods' ontological status to that of mere simulacra and imagines. 7 And in the modern era scholars have been polarized since the nineteenth century between "realists" and "idealists", the former arguing that Epicurus conceived his deities as having real, discrete seen, but rather his works" ([oÈk] Obbink) ). The godlessness of Epicurean philosophy was something of a topos in antiquity, as the existence of a work-Phld. De piet. (Obbink 1996 & forthcoming) -largely devoted to demonstrating E(picurus') piety indicates (see Obbink 1989, 188 & 202ff.) . For charges of atheism see, e.g., Cotta's remarks at Cic. De nat. deor. 1.85 & 123 and Sext. Emp. Math. 9.58 . Further references in Winiarczyk 1984, 168-70 , where, however, Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.68 is omitted. 5 See, e.g., Mansfeld 1999, 454 & 457-62. 6 See, e.g., Asmis 1984, 317: "Epicurean positive theology...is perhaps the least satisfactory of their doctrines". For the question as to the gods' existence cf., e.g., Sext. Emp. Math. 9. 48 (ékoloÊyvw d¢ zht«men ka‹ per‹ toË efi efis‹ yeo¤) and Mansfeld 1999, 454-5 ("Epicurus [was] obliged to formulate arguments in support of the existence of the gods"). In fact, the closest thing to a formal proof of existence that we get in Epicureanism is the highly rhetorical proof from consensio omnium at Cic. De nat. deor. 1.43-44 (on which see Obbink 1992, 193-202 existence like that of any solid object in the world, the latter protesting that the philosopher's gods did indeed exist, but strictly as ideational constructs, not independent of the human mind. 8 In this paper, I seek to skirt this ontological morass by contending that we should rather approach the atomist theological program as a phenomenology of epiphany, an inquiry into the divine, not as it is in itself, quoad se, but quoad nos, as it is perceived or experienced-classically, through epiphany. Atomist thought about the gods may thus be viewed as only secondarily an inquiry into the metaphysics of the divine nature; primarily, I submit, Epicurus and Democritus offered their theological programs in an attempt to accommodate an ineradicable aspect of contemporary religious experience within their own systems of philosophical therapeia. This is not to deny that these atomists are doing metaphysical work in support of their theological views; but, as will emerge, the metaphysical aspects of their theological thought-uncertain as these aspects are, whether by design, inattention or fault of transmission-appear as secondary, largely intended to "save the appearances" of divine apparition and provide ad hoc grounding for their phenomenology of epiphany and their assessment of its attendant ethical and epistemological consequences.
I. Epiphany in Ancient Greek Culture
One need only refer to the table of contents of this volume to see that epiphany as a phenomenon pervades Greek culture from top to bottom. We find literary representations of epiphany in poetry and prose, graphic depictions in every medium and 8 Long & Sedley 1987, vol. 1, 144-9 , represents the classic recent formulation of the idealist position. Their thesis has a venerable pedigree, for which see the references at Obbink 1996, 11n3 and Obbink 2002, 214n104 . Add the most recent contributions, Purinton 2001 . Cf. also Kany-Turpin 1986 . For the realist position, see Mansfeld 1993 , with references (and cf. Mansfeld 1999 . Santoro 2000 , 60-5, Kleve 2003 , and Wigodsky 2004 represent the latest defenses of the realist position.
the testimony of individuals in a profusion of first person reports, including inscriptions and papyri. 9 We have an example of the latter, presented with perhaps a touch of literary art, in a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus that describes Asclepius' appearance to two people at his temple in Memphis. The author lay ill and incubating, his mother watching over him, until "a terrifying divine apparition (fantas¤a) approached...larger than a man, clothed in shining raiment, carrying a book in his left hand" and cured his illness. Both mother and son saw the god, she with eyes open, he in his sleep. 10 It is worth noting that two large stelai recording curative epiphanies of much this sort were erected at Epidaurus at about the time of Epicurus' birth. 11 These divine manifestations should not be viewed as superstitious curiosities superadded to a non-experiential Greek religious orthodoxy.
Instead, epiphany-and the phenomenon encompasses not only the appearance of a god in bodily form, but also a variety of direct divine interventions in the mundane order of things-was the distinctive mechanism through which, as Christian Wildberg writes, "the 9 Pfister 1924 is fundamental. Excellent discussions: Dodds 1951, 102-134; Hanson 1980; Versnel 1987; Lane Fox 1987 , 102-67. See van Straten 1976 for a review of the epigraphical/votive evidence. 10 P. Oxy 11.1381, coll. v-vii (ii AD Edelstein & Edelstein 1945, T. 423 (vol. 1, pp. 221-37 ) (= IG IV 2 1, 121-2).
unilateral relationship of the divine to the world of mortals" was expressed and was thus a condition of the possibility of cultic religiosity.
12

II. Democritus' e ‡dvla and the Aetiology of Belief in Gods
Democritus and the Greek atomists would have been the last philosophers to dismiss the phenomenon of epiphany. Their epistemological commitments forbade them simply to discount any appearance or perception as an empty hallucination without basis in atomic reality (Aët. 4.8.10 = DK 67 A 30):
13
LeÊkippow, DhmÒkritow, ÉEp¤kourow tØn a ‡syhsin ka‹ tØn nÒhsin g¤nesyai efid≈lvn ¶jvyen prosiÒntvn: mhden‹ går §pibãllein mhdet°ran xvr‹w toË prosp¤ptontow efid≈lou.
Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus: perception and thought come about due to e ‡dvla [i.e., atomic images] coming in from outside; for neither occurs to anyone without e ‡dvla impinging.
On this principle, Democritus would have been obliged to accept that appearances of the gods had an objective basis in the interaction of atoms and void that was independent of the perceiver. 14 Any account of epiphany he offered would have to incorporate the impingement of atomic images, e ‡dvla, upon the sensoria. 15 Thus Sextus Empiricus is 12 Wildberg 1999 12 Wildberg -2000 , describes three "dimensions" in the relationship between gods and mortals: epiphany, piety ("the unilateral relationship of humans to the divine"), and reciprocity ("the notion of religious consequentialism"). As we shall see, atomist theological thought accepted all three of these dimensions as givens while transforming them in subtle but fundamental ways. 13 The Epicurean maxim "all sense impressions are true" is well known (Lucr. 4.478-9; Diog. Laert. 10.31-2; fr. 253 Us; see Long & Sedley 1987, vol. 1, 77-8, and below, section III) . For D(emocritus), the correspondence of sense impressions and appearances to the actual state of things is more problematic (see the comparison of D. and E. on this score in Furley 1993; the evidence for D.'s epistemology is evaluated in Guthrie 1965, 454-65, and Taylor 1999, 216-22) tÚ d¢ e ‡dvla e‰nai §n t" peri°xonti Íperfu∞ ka‹ ényrvpoeide›w ¶xonta morfåw ka‹ kayÒlou toiaËta ıpo›a boÊletai aÍt" énaplãttein DhmÒkritow, pantel«w §sti dusparãdekton.
That there are in the atmosphere e ‡dvla that have enormous man-like shapes, and in general every sort of thing Democritus wishes to invent for himself, is entirely unacceptable.
Democritus held that these divine e ‡dvla fall upon our sensoria, communicating to our perception the grand, anthropomorphous forms of the gods. He may have conceived of his epiphanic e ‡dvla as atomic effluences, diaphanous films of atoms that preserve the form of the divine substance from which they emanate-épÚ t∞w ye¤aw oÈs¤aw in the A 135) ) by the thesis that the eye itself emits a stream of atoms that goes out to meet the effluence from objects and that in tandem these produce an imprint (épotÊpvsiw) on the air between them; this imprint then enters the eye and produces vision. On these two versions of D.'s theory of perception see Guthrie 1965 , 438-45, and Furley 1987 , 131ff. Burkert 1977 argues that for D., e ‡dvla are associated solely with "parapsychological" phenomena, such as epiphany, and not with his theory of perception per se. This seems doubtful on the evidence of, e.g., Theophr. De sens. 51 (cited by Burkert, p. 103) , where Theophr., citing D.'s book Per‹ t«n efid≈lvn (I accept suggested emendation of the Per‹ t«n efid«n of the MSS), wonders why D. did not limit his theory to the impact of e ‡dvla but introduced the superfluous "imprint" as well. DhmÒkritow d¢ e ‡dvlã tinã fhsin §mpelãzein to›w ényr≈poiw...: e‰nai d¢ taËta megãla te ka‹ Íperfu∞ ka‹ dÊsfyarta m°n, oÈk êfyarta d°, proshma¤nein te tå m°llonta to›w ényr≈poiw yevroÊmena ka‹ fvnåw éfi°nta. ˜yen toÊtvn aÈt«n fantas¤an labÒntew ofl palaio‹ ÍpenÒhsan e‰nai yeÒn.
Democritus says that certain e ‡dvla come to men...; and the e ‡dvla are great and huge and they die hard, but they are not indestructible, and they foretell the future to people when they are perceived and emit voice. Hence, having received the apparition of these e ‡dvla, the ancients understood that god exists.
Sextus writes to much the same effect in introducing the Democritean citation at Math. : Winiarczyk 1984, 163, and Salem 1996, 293-4) , have tried in one way or another to diminish the theological element in D.'s thought: to the preceding references add, e.g., Zeller 1881 , 286ff., Freeman 1953 , 314-5, Salem 1996 , 293-300, Hourcade 2000 and, in their own ways, Warren 2002 and Jaeger 1947, 180-1, this latter the most sympathetic. Against this chorus , Eisenberger 1970 , and Taylor 1999 have been professed by Protagoras in his treatise On Gods (DK 80 B 4) . Against this backdrop of agnosticism, and psychologizing, politicizing demystification, Democritus in fact stood out in sharp contrast. As we have seen, he was largely constrained to accept religious phenomena, not only epiphany but also divination and prophecy (as indeed the quotation above suggests), and even the evil eye and the divine madness of poets. 26 We will return to the theological aspects of Democritus' cultural anthropology in section IV.
III. Epicurean Phenomenology of Epiphany
Epicurus, like his predecessor, constructs his theology so as to save the appearances. That is, he seeks to acknowledge the phenomenon of epiphanic experience under terms that do not put him in conflict with his own fundamental metaphysical and epistemological principles. Indeed, on these very principles he could hardly deny the experience of epiphany its objectivity. Like Democritus, he requires the impact of e ‡dvla on the sensoria for both vision and mental visualization (Ep. Hdt. 49):
27 de› d¢ ka‹ nom¤zein §peisiÒntow tinÚw épÚ t«n ¶jvyen tåw morfåw ırçn ≤mçw ka‹ dianoe›syai.
It is necessary to suppose that we see and think of shapes due to something coming in to us from the things outside us.
And like Democritus, he organizes his phenomenology of epiphany along diachronic and synchronic axes, that is to say, 1) a chronicle of the phenomenon's manifestation in cultural history, coupled with 2) an attempt to specify the underlying atomic conditions, as in Democritus' fiery, free-floating e ‡dvla, that must obtain in order to render the phenomenon intelligible in terms of the atomist system. This latter aspect of Epicurean experience and thus needs no demonstration, but rather serves as the basis for all argument and inference. 33 Thus, by describing knowledge of the gods as §nargAEw, Epicurus indicates that no logical proof is required to demonstrate their existence. By the same token, we may be sure that he intends to emphasize the perceptual and inductive-rather than the inferential or deductive-aspects of that knowledge. 34 Here the Epicurean tradition is unanimous.
Lucretius, in his disquisition on the origin of civilization, proposes to tell us "the cause that has spread the divine presence of the gods throughout the entire world" (5.1161ff.).
"Namely," he writes (5.1169ff.),
quippe etenim iam tum divom mortalia saecla egregias animo facies vigilante videbant 1170 et magis in somnis mirando corporis auctu.
Already long ago mortal generations used to see / with waking minds, and even more in sleep, / the appearances of the gods, dazzling in the marvelous size of their bodies.
In this passage, Lucretius will have drawn on Book 12 of his master's On Nature. 35 We have a fragment of this book, preserved in Philodemus' treatise De pietate, which hints at the archaeology of religion there put forth. Festugière 1955, 68n39 . Contrast this with the Stoic method of proof through logical demonstration as reported at Diog. Laert. 7.52: ≤ d¢ katãlhciw g¤netai kat' aÈtoÁw afisyAEsei m¢n leuk«n ka‹ melãnvn ka‹ trax°vn ka‹ le¤vn, lÒgƒ d¢ t«n di' épode¤jevw sunagom°nvn, Àsper tÚ yeoÁw e‰nai, ka‹ pronoe›n toÊtouw ("It is by sense perception, they hold, that we get cognition of white and black, rough and smooth, but it is by reason that we get cognition of conclusions reached through demonstration, such as the gods' existence and their providence" (trans.
Long & Sedley 1987, vol. 1, 248) or was destabilized during the experience, as the reports of the sick man and his mother in the papyrus cited above indicate. 40 This situation in the larger culture is reflected in the Epicurean phenomenology of epiphany. The gods are perceived not by one of the five senses, but by the mind: they are lÒgƒ yevrhto¤.
41 Thus, the experience of god is a psychic affair, and it matters little whether the subject is awake or asleep during the encounter. Recall that for Democritus, the gods, however else they are to be conceived, were composed of the finest atoms, those of fire. For Epicurus, the phenomenologically psychic nature of epiphany has its metaphysical correlate in the doctrine that the e ‡dvla of the gods are composed of exceptionally fine particles, of a sort too subtle to register to our gross vision, yet of a "size to fit into our...thought" (diãnoia These recurrent visions provided early mankind not only the grounds of their belief in the gods' existence, but also, due to their §nãrgeia, a basis for inference about them.
Lucretius tells us that the regularity and fixity over time exhibited by the divine apparitions led the ancients to ascribe immortality to the gods (5.1175-8):
aeternamque dabant vitam, quia semper eorum subpeditabatur facies et forma manebat.
They gave them eternal life, since the appearance / of them was in constant supply and their forms endured.
Here the atomists part ways. Democritus, no doubt constrained by his own theory of the diãlusiw of all atomic compounds, and indeed the kosmoi themselves, 46 will say of his 'idolic' gods only that they are dÊsfyarta, not êfyarta (DK 68 B 166). Epicurus, beholden to the same doctrine of universal disintegration, 47 nonetheless felt the need to preserve divine immortality, as Lucretius' account hints and as we shall see below.
The ancients attributed eternal happiness to the gods as well. , who accounts for "false" dreams, e.g., of centaurs, by explaining that 1) such images can form spontaneously in midair, or 2) the imagines of a man and a horse may mingle in midair, and thus impress a garbled picture of a man-horse on our minds. In these cases the dream is "true" in the sense that it reflects really existing imagines: error or deception arises in the assumption of the sleeping mind, which lacks the criterial support of the five bodily senses, that the imagines correspond to existing solid objects, e.g., actual centaurs Thus they supposed them to be far superior in their fortunes, / because fear of death never bothered any of them, / and because at the same time in dreams they saw them accomplish / many wonders and to suffer no trouble for it themselves.
In these cases, the ancients worked out the implications of what they saw with the help of a logical process for which the Epicurean technical term was metãbasiw. Sextus
Empiricus describes metãbasiw, as it operated in theological contexts, as inference about the gods by way of analogy with human beings (Math. 9.45-6):
48
Ofl d¢ ka‹ prÚw toËtÒ fasin, ˜ti ≤ m¢n érxØ t∞w noAEsevw toË e‰nai yeÚn g°gonen épÚ t«n katå toÁw Ïpnouw findallom°nvn...tÚ d¢ é¤dion e‰nai tÚn yeÚn ka‹ êfyarton ka‹ t°leion §n eÈdaimon¤& par∞lye katå tØn épÚ t«n ényr≈pvn metãbasin. [...] oÏtvw ênyrvpon eÈda¤mona noAEsantew ka‹ makãrion ka‹ sumpeplhrvm°non pçsi to›w égayo›w, e‰ta taËta §pite¤nantew tÚn §n aÈto›w §ke¤noiw êkron §noAEsamen yeÒn. (46) ka‹ pãlin poluxrÒniÒn tina fantasivy°ntew ênyrvpon ofl palaio‹ §phÊjhsan tÚn xrÒnon efiw êpeiron, prossunãcantew t" §nest«ti ka‹ tÚn parƒxhm°non ka‹ tÚn m°llonta: e‰ta §nteËyen efiw ¶nnoian éid¤ou paragenÒmenoi ¶fasan ka‹ é¤dion e‰nai tÚn yeÒn.
And against this they [sc. Epicureans] say that the origin of the idea that there is a god arose from images in sleep...but that god is eternal and imperishable and perfect in happiness came about by analogical inference (metãbasiw) from human beings. [...] Thus, conceiving a man who is happy and blessed and full of everything good, then by extending this we conceive god as highest in these same things.
[46] And again, having envisioned a certain long-lived man, the ancients extended his lifetime to infinity, by combining the past and future with the present. Then arriving in this way at the notion of eternity they said god is also eternal.
By analogy with the happiness and longevity of men, the ancients inferred that the gods, if their divinity was to set them apart, must possess happiness and longevity in the superlative degree. Thus, when Epicurus instructs us to think of god as z"ow, êfyartow Cf. Blickman 1989, 159. 51 Ep. Hdt. 75-6 illustrates these three stages with the example of the origin of language. In the first stage, pãyh and fantãsmata spontaneously give rise to the first words. In the second stage, the rudimentary language is rationalized through the coining of terms (tå ‡dia (sc. ÙnÒmata) tey∞nai) and the weeding out of ambiguities (tåw dhl≈seiw ∏tton émfibÒlouw). In the third stage, knowledgable men (toÁw suneidÒtaw) introduce novel concepts and discoveries (oÈ sunor≈mena prãgmata) as well as the terminological innovations in which to express them. See further Campbell 2003, 283ff ., with references.
and "supposed" ('putabant ', 5.1178 & 1179) that certain qualities pertained to the divine.
It is clear that this dual process of perception and logical inference, reported in De rerum natura 5, but of course derived from Epicurus himself, was conceived as not only historical and aetiological but as the ongoing ground of our knowledge of deity. This is evident in the language, to which that of Lucretius is so obviously akin, of Epicurus' assertion that our knowledge of the gods is §nargAEw, and of his further injunction that we "consider", "attach" and "believe" (nom¤zvn, prÒsapte, dÒjaze) that the qualities of imperishability and bliss belong to the divine nature (Ep. Hdt. 123):
Pr«ton m¢n tÚn yeÚn z"on êfyarton ka‹ makãrion nom¤zvn, …w ≤ koinØ toË yeoË nÒhsiw Ípegrãfh, mhy¢n mAEte t∞w éfyars¤aw éllÒtrion mAEte t∞w makariÒthtow éno¤keion aÈt" prÒsapte: pçn d¢ tÚ fulãttein aÈtoË dunãmenon tØn metå éfyars¤aw makariÒthta per‹ aÈtÚn dÒjaze.
First, considering the god to be living, imperishable and blessed, as the common notion of god is in outline, attach nothing to him that is either foreign to imperishability or unsuited to blessedness.
But believe everything about him that is able to preserve his blessedness along with his imperishability.
The notion of gods of imperishable bliss thus compounded from experience and inference forms, in the technical lexicon of Epicurean epistemology, the prÒlhciw of divinity, 52 that is, the generic concept which is guaranteed to be true as a result of its formulation from both repeated experience of particulars and warranted inference from them.
That the gods' blessedness presents no prima facie conflict with the principles of atomism appears obvious; but for the Epicureans immortality was not only a concomitant of but a requirement for divine blessedness, for if the gods were liable to destruction, they would be as liable to anxiety about their deaths as we are. The Epicureans, then, unlike
Democritus, who claimed neither blessedness nor immortality for his gods, had to find a way to reconcile divine imperishability with their doctrine of universal disintegration. This Cicero's Epicurean, Velleius, attempts to do at De natura deorum 1.49, a passage that constitutes, for our purposes, a convenient place to survey briefly the realist v.
idealist impasse and then to try to find a plausible route around, rather than through, it.
In an earlier passage Velleius had stated that a very similar conception of the gods-indeed, the conception arrived at, in cultural history, by earliest mankind-is shared by all humanity (1. Epicurus teaches that the essence and constitution of the gods is such that it is primarily discerned not by sensation but by the mind, having neither any solidity nor numerical unity like those things which, on account of their firmness, he calls "solid objects;" but the images are grasped by their similarity and by a process of crossing-over, since an endless vision of very similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and flows to the gods, and our minds, fixed and intent, with the greatest pleasure, on these images, gain an understanding of what a blessed and eternal nature is.
Before delving into this passage, and the controversy that I intend to focalize through it, it will be prudent to make a first approach to the differences in the assumptions behind the since the images are fine, the mind is only able to perceive sharply / those it strains to see; then all the images that exist / besides these perish, except those for which the mind has prepared itself. This is the "mental focusing"-Epicurus terms it §pibolØ t∞w diano¤aw (Ep. Hdt.
51)-to which Velleius refers when he says, "our minds, fixed and intent, with the greatest pleasure, on these images, gain an understanding of what a blessed and eternal nature is".
53
One way to characterize the difference between the realist and idealist views is as a disagreement over which of the three image-generating processes listed by Lucretius should be regarded as the primary source of images of the gods. Realists will opt for model 2, saying that the gods, as independently existing entities, that is, res among many other variae res, emit the imagines which we perceive. Idealists, on the other hand, will 53 On §pibolØ t∞w diano¤aw see Asmis 1984, 118-126. choose models 1 and/or 3, asserting that the images of the gods arise randomly, or are but agglutinations of random, human-shaped images formed in accord with models 1 and 2.
Thus, to turn now to the Ciceronian passage presented above, it is possible to present a cogent summary of Velleius' speech along idealist lines as follows. Our minds pick out and conflate the godlike imagines that are eternally and randomly being generated out of the infinite fund of atoms and flowing toward us (cum infinita simillumarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis existat) and in this way we arrive at the discrete concepts of our various deities. Thus, since any individual god is, in effect, nothing but the sum of its images in the human mind, no god exists as a numerically distinct, solid object, as for example you or I do (nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum, ut ea quae ille propter firmitatem ster°mnia appellat). The gods are, instead, "thought-constructs".
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On this idealist reading, Cicero's term similitudo/simillumus must be taken as referring to the similarity of the imagines to each other, their formal unity or identity, rather than to their similarity to a divine body, a solid original from which they flow, as In the two words ad deos, transmitted by the manuscripts, 64 we are faced with a textual and hermeneutical crux which can, in a sense, stand metonymically for the whole realist v. idealist debate. Long and Sedley, advocates of an idealist interpretation, accept the reading of the MSS. They take Velleius' assertion that the images "flow to the gods" to be saying of the images that "by converging on our minds they become our gods". 65 67 Scholion to Epicurus Kyriai Doxai 1: §n êlloiw d° fhsi toÁw yeoÁw lÒgƒ yevrhtoÊw, oÓw m¢n kat' ériymÒn Ífest«taw, oÓw d¢ katå ımoe¤deian, §k t∞w sunexoËw §pirrÊsevw t«n ımo¤vn efid≈lvn §p‹ tÚ aÈtÚ épotetelesm°nvn, ényrvpoeide›w. A discussion of this highly compressed and vexed bit of doxographical data, which is as contested as the Cic. passage under discussion (for a taste, see almost any of the references in n8), is prohibited here by considerations of space. 68 E.g., Rist 1972, 144-6 & 174; Mansfeld 1993 , 191n47, 192 & 196-201 (cf. Mansfeld 1999 per §p‹ t«n mete≈rvn oÈx Ípãrxei, éllå taËtã ge pleonaxØn ¶xei ka‹ t∞w gen°sevw afit¤an ka‹ t∞w oÈs¤aw ta›w afisyAEsesi sÊmfvnon kathgor¤an. oÈ går katå éji≈mata kenå ka‹ 69 Long & Sedley 1987, vol. ?, ??? , assert that Lucretius did not understand the master's teaching on the divine constitution, but not that he willfully flouted orthodoxy. See Kleve 2003, 255-6 & 265. 70 On Epicurus' acceptance of multiple causal explanations, see Asmis 1984, 321-30. 71 nomoyes¤aw fusiologht°on, éll' …w tå fainÒmena §kkale›tai: (87) oÈ går fidialog¤aw ka‹ ken∞w dÒjhw ı b¤ow ≤m«n ¶xei xre¤an, éllå toË éyorÊbvw ≤mçw z∞n. pãnta m¢n oÔn g¤netai ése¤stvw katå pãntvn katå pleonaxÚn trÒpon §kkayairom°nvn sumf≈nvw to›w fainom°noiw, tan tiw tÚ piyanologoÊmenon Íp¢r aÈt«n deÒntvw katal¤p˙: ˜tan d° tiw tÚ m¢n épol¤p˙ tÚ d¢ §kbãl˙ ımo¤vw sÊmfvnon ¯n t" fainom°nƒ, d∞lon ˜ti ka‹ §k pantÚw §kp¤ptei fusiologAEmatow, §p‹ d¢ tÚn mËyon katarre›.
This [i.e., the method of positing single causes] does not hold in the case of meteorological phenomena, but these things have multiple causes of their coming-to-be and multiple predications about their existence that agree with perceptions. For we should not provide explanations of nature in accord with empty dogmas and decrees, but as the phenomena invite. (87) For our life has no need of subjective theory and empty opinion, but we need to live without disturbance. No disturbance arises with respect to all the things that are accounted for by the method of multiple causes in agreement with the phenomena, whenever one admits, as one ought, what is explained by probability. But whenever one accepts one explanation and rejects another that is likewise in agreement with the phenomenon, it is clear that one falls away from all scientific reasoning and descends into myth.
A single illustration of Epicurus' method of multiple causes will suffice here. He asserts that the source of the moon's light cannot be determined to the exclusion of all other possibilities. Since the moon is not an object that we can approach for examination or upon which we can conduct experiments, we must content ourselves with positing a variety of inherently possible sources for its light, forgoing any urge to explain its observed illumination by recourse to a single cause (Ep. Pyth. 94-5):
72 ¶ti te §nd°xetai <m¢n> tØn selAEnhn §j •aut∞w ¶xein tÚ f«w, §nd°xetai d¢ épÚ toË ≤l¤ou. (95) ka‹ går par' ≤m›n yevre›tai pollå m¢n §j •aut«n ¶xonta, pollå d¢ éf' •t°rvn: ka‹ oÈy¢n §mpodostate› t«n §n to›w mete≈roiw fainom°nvn, §ãn tiw toË pleonaxoË trÒpou ée‹ mnAEmhn ¶x˙ ka‹ tåw ékoloÊyouw aÈto›w Ípoy°seiw ëma ka‹ afit¤aw sunyevrª ka‹ mØ énabl°pvn efiw tå énakÒlouya taËt' Ùgko› mata¤vw ka‹ katarr°p˙ êllote êllvw §p‹ tÚn monaxÚn trÒpon.
Besides, it is possible that the moon has its own light, and it is possible that it gets it from the sun. (95) For in fact in our experience many things are seen to have their own light, and many get their light from something else. None of the meteorological phenomena stands in our way, if we always remember the method of multiple causes and observe at the same time the explanations and causes that accord with the phenomena, and if we do not look to what does not accord and heap these things up in vain and fall back in one way or another to the method of a single cause.
Is it conceivable that for the Epicureans, the gods might well have been analogous to the moon in this example? That epiphany, like the light of the moon, might have been a phenomenon that admitted of a number of plausible explanations? The gods are not 72 Cf. Lucr. 6.703-11 and, for a multitude of such examples, Lucr. 5.509ff. available for us to touch and observe at close hand, like trees or our own bodies or any of the things of our daily experience; like the celestial bodies, we perceive them only through the apparition of e ‡dvla that stream to us across indeterminate distances. 73 Thus, on Epicurus' principle of multiple causes, the e ‡dvla of the gods might well be explained by appeal to any one of the three ways listed by Lucretius, which we examined above.
They might well, as the realists suggest, flow from the bodies of the gods. Or, as the idealist position requires, the gods' e ‡dvla might equally well arise spontaneously in the atmosphere, from the random agglomeration of atoms. Indeed some gods might be the result, as Philodemus appears to say in a controversial passage in De dis III, of the collision and adhesion of e ‡dvla in midair. At coll. 8.37-9.14 he writes of the intertwining or entanglement (his verb is sump[l°]kontai, col. 8.41) of what must be the gods' e ‡dvla with the e ‡dvla of stars and other heavenly bodies and of the impression generated in those receiving the resulting epiphanies that the sun and the moon are gods. 74 Whatever the proper interpretation of this difficult passage, I would suggest that our epiphanies of the gods can on good atomist principles result from any one or a combination of these three causes, none of which, in the nature of the case, can be either decisively ruled out or definitively proven.
Let me be clear. I would not seek to assert, in the silence of our evidence, that the Epicureans ever explicitly equated epiphany with tå met°vra, or made a point of subjecting it to the method of multiple causes. I will, however, suggest that although the 73 The famous intermundia, the gods' dwelling places that lie between worlds, have no sure warrant in any surviving Epicurean writings but are cited by Cicero at De nat. deor. 1.18. The intermundia are often said to be alluded to in Lucr. 3.18-24. See Obbink 1996, 7n5. 74 I cite the text of Woodward (1989) what is really at stake in our efforts to supply these atomists with such an answer, or in the struggle between realists and idealists to assert a monaxØ afit¤a for the Epicurean phenomenon of epiphany. In a theological context of providence or grace, such as obtains in Christianity, where God is the guarantor and highest instantiation of Being Itself, the ontology of the divine is necessarily a central issue whose answer entails real consequences. But for a theology that asserts the remoteness of the gods from our concerns and denies the divine any agency whatsoever in our world (we will turn to this issue in the next section), such metaphysical questions tend naturally to lose their 75 Obbink ????????????. Cf. Mansfeld 1999, ???. urgency. Again, I do not mean to imply that Epicureans never engaged such questions.
Philodemus De dis III, for example, with its lengthy, though fragmentary, discussion of the physical basis of the gods' immortality, proves that they did, and did so elaborately. Thus, wholly in keeping with their own concerns and methods, our atomists were ultimately less invested in the technical details of the divine being and more concerned with the phenomena of the gods par' ≤m›n and the ethical consequences of the religious ideas to which they gave rise. To these ethical issues we now turn. In what has gone before we saw that the aetiological story told by both Democritus and
IV. Atomist Aetiology of Religious Error
Epicurus posits the experience of epiphany as the origin of mankind's idea of the gods.
We also saw that Epicurus described a second stage, in which mankind's raw belief in the gods' existence was modified by a process of inference from sense data to include the predicates of immortality and blessedness. We saw, too, that these stages in the evolution of religious ideas were of a piece with Epicurus' general theory of cultural development.
We turn now to two further episodes in religious history, both dealing with theological They [i.e., early humans] observed the patterns of the heavens and the / various seasons of the years turning in their sure order, / and they were not able to understand by what causes this happened. / Therefore their refuge was to entrust everything to the gods / and to make all things directed by their nod. / And they located the seat and abode of the gods in the sky, / since night and the moon are seen revolving through the sky, / moon, day, and night, and the austere constellations of night / and the night-wandering torches of the sky and flying flames, / clouds, sun, rains, snow, winds, lightning, hail, / and the rapid roarings and great rumblings of threatening thunder. / Oh unhappy human race, to attribute such doings / to the gods and to attach to them bitter wrath! / What groans they produced for themselves, and what / wounds for us, what tears for our descendants! The misprision of natural phenomena propagated a mistaken belief in the favor and wrath of the gods, an error following from want of physiologia as much as from a failure to Sedley 1998, 122-3) . What the epitome drops through abridgment-and Lucr. supplies-is the origin of belief in the gods as well as the origin of the theological error that does come up for criticism at Ep. . See the charts of correspondences in Sedley 1998, 133 & 136. Phld. De piet. 232-288 (Obbink) , discussed immediately below, preserves a complementary account of the first attributions of disturbance, anger, etc. to the gods (see comm. ad loc.). 84 Phld. De piet. 307; cf. 238 (Obbink) . But I shall begin with the self-important theologians and poets, since they are the ones who are especially praised by those who attack us, on the grounds we are setting forth views impious and disadvantageous to mankind. And I think it would not be a useless labour in general nor a long one to display them as arch-enemies for all time in a choros.
Thus, this third and final stage of theological error extends from the earliest poet to the latest Stoic.
The tripartite archaeology of religious belief I have reconstructed above conforms to the general theory of cultural history outlined by Epicurus at Epistle to Herodotus 75.
As we have seen, in a first stage, raw experience teaches its lessons. In a second stage, mankind applies reason to the data of experience in order to sharpen ( §pakriboËn, Ep. ka‹ ı DhmÒkritow: ır«ntew gãr, fhs¤, tå §n to›w mete≈roiw payAEmata ofl palaio‹ t«n ényr≈pvn kayãper brontåw ka‹ éstrapåw keraunoÊw te ka‹ êstrvn sunÒdouw ≤l¤ou te ka‹ selAEnhw §kle¤ceiw §deimatoËnto yeoÁw ofiÒmenoi toÊtvn afit¤ouw e‰nai.
And Democritus: "Seeing the happenings in the heavens, such as thunder and lightening and thunderbolts and the collisions of stars and the eclipses of the sun and the moon, the ancient peoples were frightened, supposing gods to be the cause of these things."
88 Thus, in DK 68 A 75, B 30 & B 166, Guthrie 1965 , 478, sees inconsistency, Henrichs 1975 , sees "two different but by no means mutually exclusive explanations", Jaeger 1947, 182, finds two different theories for the origin of belief in god, but attempts to reconcile them as moments within a broader, psychologizing explanatory model from awe and fear (cf. Babut 1974 , 47-9 & Salem 1996 yen oÈk épeikÒtvw ı DhmÒkritow t«n log¤vn ényr≈pvn Ùl¤gouw fhs¤n énate¤nantaw tåw xe›raw §ntaËya, ˘n nËn ±°ra kal°omen ofl ÜEllhnew, pãnta D¤a muye›syai, ka‹ pãnta otow o‰den ka‹ dido› ka‹ éfaire›tai, ka‹ basileÁw otow t«n pãntvn.
Hence not unreasonably Democritus says that a few of the eloquent men, stretching their hands up to that place which now we Greeks call the air, [said] "Zeus converses about all things with himself, and he knows all, and he gives and takes away, and he is king of all". 90 My translation is based on that in Obbink (forthcoming). This fragment is also presented, translated and discussed in Henrichs 1975. 91 The adjective lÒgiow (DK 68 B 30) need not denote approbation: cf. Pfligersdorffer 1943-7, 27 , who understands these men as heroic Kulturschöpfer; Mansfeld 1999, 470n95 more plausibly suggests they were "clever people" who "capitalized" on the fear and awe generated by natural phenomena. 92 Montano 1984, 456 , sees in B 30 "une phase plus avancée" than that of A 75, i.e., a second stage in which learned men "ont théorisé une religion plus complexe" (orig. emph.). He nonetheless perpetuates the error that A 75 describes the origin of belief in gods and condemns B 166 as non-theological (!) (p. 464-7).
In his full account of this final stage, as in the corresponding stage in the Epicurean scheme evidenced by Philodemus, Democritus would presumably have included everyone from archaic poets, such as Hesiod, to philosophers, such as his own somewhat senior contemporary Diogenes of Apollonia, who praised Homer for thinking Zeus was the air, and omniscient (DK 64 A 8).
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V. Therapeia
At this point a caveat is in order. As fascinating as this anthropological and culturalcritical strain in their thought is, it would be a mistake to suppose that the atomists pursued these investigations in a disinterested celebration of knowledge for its own sake.
Rather, they will have approached these questions in the same spirit in which, as we saw in section III., they approached meteorological phenomena, where the end sought in science was étaraj¤a. Thus, in their cultural-historical work, the Epicureans and, I will suggest, Democritus were carrying out an archaeology of fear, trying to uncover the historical and cultural origins of humanity's superstitious fear of the gods-what Theophrastus called deisidaimonia (Char. 16)-and in this way to restore our religious conceptions to something like an original purity. Plutarch paints a particularly vivid picture of the ills caused by fear of the gods when he writes that the deisidaimôn "fears everything, earth, sea, air, sky, darkness, light, an outcry, silence"; his dreams are filled with "frightful images (e ‡dvla) and awesome apparitions and various punishments".
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This is a malady that terrorizes its victims with inauspicious epiphanies.
93 See also Diog. Apoll. DK 64 B 5. Cf., e.g., Anaximenes (DK 13 A 10), who thought air was divine. 94 Plut. De superst. 165e-f. Cf. Theophr. Char. 16.8 & 11. It is also a malady for which Epicurus has a cure. At Epistle to Herodotus 76-82 he treats the fear of sky-gods described by Lucretius. 95 He argues that the leitourgia, or public service at one's own expense, of managing a cosmos and directing the weather, as well as anger and favor, are logically inconsistent with blessedness (77):
96 oÈ går sumfvnoËsi pragmate›ai ka‹ front¤dew ka‹ Ùrga‹ ka‹ xãritew makariÒthti, éll' §n ésyene¤& ka‹ fÒbƒ ka‹ prosdeAEsei t«n plhs¤on taËta g¤netai.
For labors and cares and angers and favors do not harmonize with blessedness, but arise in weakness and fear and dependency on neighbors.
The importance of this deduction is seen in the fact that Epicurus makes it his first order of business in his Kyriai doxai (KD 1): "What is blessed and imperishable neither has any troubles itself nor causes any for another: thus it is bound by neither anger nor favor. For everything of this sort resides in weakness". 97 As we have seen, Epicurus constructs his aetiology of the idea of god so as to posit blessedness as an indispensable, empirically derived constituent of that idea; this is a calculated move, for it allows him then to argue that blessedness necessarily entails freedom from all concern, fear or favor. Divine involvement in the world is categorically impossible. Just as a circle is by definition a geometric figure every point on the circumference of which is equidistant from the center, so god is by definition blessed and immortal. And immortal blessedness precludes interventionism just as circularity precludes four right angles. With this, Epicurus hurls a stone that kills the two birds of teleological theology and cultic reciprocity.
It hardly needs saying that epiphany qua expression of the divine will is ruled out as well. The vision of a god is instead merely a byproduct of atomic physics (on both 95 On E.'s criticism of "astral religion", here and in Ep. Pyth., see Festugière 1955, 73-93. 96 Cf. Ep. Pyth. 97, Similar priority shown in Lucr.'s remarks on religio at 1.62ff. and in Diog. Oen.'s placement of fear of the gods first on his list of disturbing emotions at fr. 34.VII (Smith).
realist and idealist views). 98 But did Epicurus thus intend to abolish cult practice? On the contrary, Philodemus reports that Epicurus himself attended the festivals of the gods, "progressing to an understanding of the divine nature, through having its name the whole time on his lips". 99 He sublimated cult to a mental askesis, the outward forms of traditional worship executed with proper inward attitude. Epicurean terminology, which emphasizes our role in maintaining the gods' prerogatives, reflects this. 100 As we saw above, the Letter to Menoeceus enjoins us to "preserve" (fulãttein, 123) the blessedness and immortality of the gods in our thoughts, while the Letter to Herodotus warns us to "guard the gods' dignity" (pçn tÚ s°mnvma thre›n, 77) in word and concept. 101 Not that the gods per se need safeguarding from impious thoughts. To return to our geometric analogy, confused ideas about circles-such as the postulate of a circle with four right angles-do no violence to circularity, but merely fail to engage with it, and incidentally may have negative consequences for those, such as geometers, who hold them. Likewise, failures of noetic piety do the gods no evil, and elicit none from them. Rather, bad theology exacts its own penalty in spiritual distress, because the contradiction internal to the illogical notion that a blessed god can be angry creates "the greatest upset in men's souls" (tÚn m°giston tãraxon §n ta›w cuxa›w, Ep. Hdt. 77). Great harms or great benefits accrue to us, depending on our theological views: afl m°gistai blãbai... §k ye«n §pãgontai ka‹ »f°leiai (Ep. Men. 124). 102 The individual thus participates in his or her own experience of god. In a sense, then, our epiphanies are up to us: to ensure auspicious encounters we must "save the appearances" of the gods from the distorting picture of popular opinion (ÍpolAEceiw ceude›w, Ep. Men. 124) and traditional paideia.
As we saw above, Democritus' archaeology of religion appears to have set the pattern for that of his descendants. We might well see a cognate therapeutics in the remains of his oeuvre. 103 However, before positing such a parallel it is important first to recall that for Democritus, unlike for Epicurus, the gods are not in fact wholly noninterventionist. His gods could reveal the future 104 and he seems to have put some stock in prayer. 105 For these reasons, Diogenes of Oenoanda criticized him for investing his e ‡dvla with excessive agency. 106 Nonetheless, Democritus took pains to allay religious anxieties. For example, he tried to neutralize fear of the afterlife by invoking his law of universal diãlusiw, asserting in effect that people make a hell of their own lives through a misbegotten fear that the soul might spend an eternity in Hades (DK 68 B 297; cf. B 234). As this suggests, Democritus believed that the underlying state of our souls was largely responsible for the quality of our response to religious ideas and experiences. He expressed this view in a more general form in his observation that the same atomic from epiphany will be largely a function of the perceiver's own psychology and expectations, and these, of course, are inherently amenable to philosophical therapy.
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But if Democritus sought such a cure for fear of the gods, his descendant could claim to have found it. Just as Epicurus' therapeutic arguments demonstrate the logical priority of his paradigm of divinity, so his archaeology of religion shows its chronological priority. 112 He razed the edifice of traditional ideas about the gods to the ground, stripping away the strata of false opinion to uncover mankind's original relationship to the gods and to reestablish on this foundation a firm basis for piety. He sought to recapture the benefit alluded to but precluded by traditional cult by displacing divine-human reciprocity to the noetic realm: if we preserve the gods' holiness in our souls they will in turn grace us as exemplars of peace and bliss. In Velleius' words at De natura deorum 1.49: "our minds, fixed and intent, with the greatest pleasure, on the images of the gods, gain an understanding of what a blessed and eternal nature is." This vision of holy bliss, in turn, recalls us to the goal of our work in philosophy.
There is of course a tension in the Epicurean hankering for return to an Edenic state, for any salvific philosophy depends upon a prior fall, a felix culpa perhaps. 
